Macquarie Dictionary and Distinctiveness

A recent decision of the Trade Marks Office on the distinctiveness of the trade mark ‘Cashcard’ for debit and credit cards reveals the potential importance of dictionary entries in the Macquarie Dictionary. Cashcard Australia Ltd [2007] ATMO 70 (8 November 2007) also demonstrates the well known proposition that extensive use of a trade mark does not necessarily equate to use generating distinctiveness of that trade mark.

The Macquarie Dictionary was first published more than 25 years ago and is the accepted dictionary of ‘Australian English’. The examiner of the application for registration of ‘Cashcard’ noted that the Macquarie Dictionary defined the word as ‘a card which allows one to perform certain banking activities via an automatic teller machine’.  Yet the entry was a relatively recent entry and the 1987 edition of the Macquarie Dictionary, published some three years after initial use of the term by the applicant, did not have the one word ‘cashcard’ in it at all.

At the hearing, the Delegate declined to attribute any significance to either the existing entry in the Macquarie Dictionary or the absence of an entry in the 1987 edition as there was no evidence as to whether the current entry was the product of the applicant’s use of the term or the fact that it had entered the common language of Australian consumers by the joining of two common words with a clear connection.

The Delegate then proceeded to form the view that the trade mark lacked inherent distinctiveness for the purposes of s41(3) of the Act. While the Macquarie Dictionary was ultimately disregarded in that decision on the issue of inherent distinctiveness, the examiner’s comments and the decision itself reflect the potential importance of the Macquarie Dictionary and why every Australian trade mark practitioner needs a copy and access to previous editions.

The Delegate’s decision also went on to consider whether “Cashcard” had acquired sufficient distinctiveness through use to justify registration pursuant to s41(6) of the Act. The applicant attempted to make much of the fact that its ‘trade mark’ appeared on 22,000 Australian ATM machines. The Delegate was unimpressed, saying (at para 30):

"I have already described the evidence used to support the original registration. It was really no more than evidence of use. Now it is all too easy to be beguiled by such evidence. There is an unspoken and illogical assumption that “use equals distinctiveness”. The illogicality can be seen from an example: no matter how much use a manufacturer made of the word “Soap” as a purported trade mark for soap the word would not be distinctive of his goods."

Other evidence, including some surveys on distinctiveness which were contaminated by some leading questions, was rejected as demonstrating distinctiveness by use.

Professor Mark Davison

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Summary Judgment in counterfeit dishwashing detergent case highlights need to know manufacturer

In PZ Cussons (International) Limited v Rosa Dora Imports Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1642 the first respondent Rosa Dora Imports Pty Ltd (Rosa Dora), had been selling and supplying alleged counterfeit dishwashing detergent products imported from Thailand bearing the applicants registered trade marks "Morning Fresh" and "Cussons" without the authorisation or approval of the applicants, PZ Cussons Australia Pty Ltd (PZ Cussons) and PZ Cussons (International) Limited (PZ Cussons International).

The respondents did not admit their use of the trade marks was not licensed, authorised, or approved by PZ Cussons and they placed no evidence before the Court that the goods were not counterfeit, nor that they had any such evidence available to them.

In granting summary judgment to the applicants The Federal Court found that the products were not made by PZ Cussons Thailand, and briefly summarised the operation of Section 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Extracts [with paragraph numbers] are as follows (per Kenny, J.):

“[13] …under s 31A, in order to grant summary judgment, I must be satisfied that the respondents have no reasonable prospect of success in defending the infringement claim. As s 31A(3) makes clear, this does not mean that I must be satisfied that their defence is hopeless or bound to fail.”

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Sound marks give Tarzan something to yell about

Sonic branding is the term used when a brand makes use of sound to communicate with consumers. Growing in popularity, and taking a variety of forms such as ring tones and jingles, sound marks are increasingly popping up in the IT, automotive and media industries.

Most recently, an application to protect the famous cry that Tarzan characteristically screams as he swings through the jungle was decided in Europe.  The Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM) refused the application on appeal; a copy of the decision can be read here.

Article 4 of the relevant Council Regulations states that a community trade mark may consist of “any sign capable of being represented graphically…provided that such signs are capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings”. The Tarzan application included two pictures: (i) an image of a wave form representation of the sound; and (ii) a spectrograph of the frequencies of the yell. The OHIM ruling provides that “what has been filed as a graphic representation is from the outset not capable of serving as a graphic representation of the applied for sound”.

The difficulty with the approach taken in Europe is that whilst musical tunes that can be represented graphically using musical notation are clearly registrable, other noises and auditory sounds which cannot be recorded as musical notation will evidently fail.

By way of contrast, the Trade Marks Office in Australia has been quite specific about acceptability of representations and descriptions of sound trade marks. An application for a sound trade mark that cannot be represented with musical notation must include the following:

  • a graphical representation of the mark, which may be a simple verbal description of the sound such as "CLIP CLOP MOO"
  • a clear and concise description of the trade mark to serve as an endorsement, for example: The trade mark consists of the sound of two steps taken by cow on pavement, followed by the sound of a cow mooing as rendered in the recording accompanying the application.
  • a recording of the trade mark on a medium which allows for easy replaying.

Currently, 33 sound marks have been registered in Australia but, as yet, creator Edgar Rice Burroughs' company does not appear to have sought protection for the famous cry here. Tarzan would go ape. Again.

 

Second Life Patent and Trademark Office Illegal in Australia?

Impact and Virtually Blind blogs report  that “the Second Life Patent and Trademark Office (SLPTO) has opened its doors.” The SLPTO appears to have no connection with the owners of Second Life, Linden Lab.

The SLPTO website states: “We allow you to register, protect, and add value to your Second Life creations to protect your intellectual property rights”. Section 157 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) prohibits use of the words "Trade Marks Office" and "words of similar import" in this jurisdiction. It states:

“(1) A person:

(a) must not:

(i) place, or allow to be placed, on the building in which his or her office is situated; or

(ii) use when advertising his or her office or business; or

(iii) place on a document, as a description of his or her office or business;

the words "Trade Marks Office" or "Office for registering trade marks", or words of similar import (whether alone or together with other words); or

(b) must not use in any other way, in connection with his or her business, words that would reasonably lead other persons to believe that his or her office is, or is officially connected with, the Trade Marks Office.

Penalty: 30 penalty units.

(2) An offence under this section is an offence of strict liability.

Similarly, section 177 of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) prohibits false representations about the Australian Patent Office. Continue Reading...

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I Hate Counterfeit Bags Info (US)

High Court says no to a Stoli

In the latest round in proceedings concerning the legal successor to the ownership of the trade marks STOLICHNAYA and a number of device and label marks for other words including STOLI, STOLICHNAYA, OHRANJ and MOSKOVSKAYA, on 5 October 2007, the High Court of Australia refused to grant special leave to appeal (from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia) to VAO Sojuzplodoimport (VAO) to seek to obtain discovery of documents from the Russian Federation.

The High Court is the court of final appeal in Australia. For more on special leave applications, click here.

The applicant for special leave, VAO, argued that the Russian Federation -- which is not a party to the proceeding and is (duh) a foreign state -- had not sued in its own name but, rather, had appointed a principal agent to recover the rights to the Australian marks. It argued: “the Russian Federation is the real plaintiff” and that “the notion of comity and immunity which would not apply were the Russian state the real plaintiff in its own name”.

The High Court held “Given the state of the preparation of this case, including the outstanding orders for discovery . . . it will be premature for this Court now to enter upon a consideration of the questions of general principle said to arise.”

The case is examining events that took place in 1992 upon the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and around that time the creation of the Russian Federation. Two Russian companies, the Federal State Enterprise Sojuzplodoimport (FKP) (created in April 2002) and the Federal Treasury Enterprise Sojuzplodoimport (FGUP) (created in April 2001) have alleged that in 1992, VAO falsely asserted it was the legal successor of the State entity that owned the marks at the time. The trade marks have since been assigned to a related company, Spirits International NV. Continue Reading...